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ABSTRACT: In the late 1970s Federal agency computer users
complained that the General Services Administration was not
accounting for "conversion costs" when choosing among alternative
suppliers of computer systems. This motivates our analysis of a
general tradeoff in procurement between the costs of switching
suppliers and the degree of "competitive behavior" elicited by
the absence of incumbent advantages in a bidding game. Our
analysis shows that arguments in favor of accounting for
conversion costs were not sufficient to justify the change in the
policies which took place. There are plausible circumstances in
which switching costs should be estimated as best they can and be
used, and circumstances where they are best ignored.
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"The issue in dispute,... began with HGOC's (House
Government Operations Committee) resistance to allowing
consideration of full costs for converting computer
programs from the form used by incumbent computers to
the form needed for equipment of prospective new
vendors. HGOC correctly believes that considering full
conversion costs tends to restrict competition to
vendors of equipment compatible with incumbent
machines.
"
— P. R. Werling (1983), pg. 138.
1. Introduction
The General Services Administration (GSA) has supervised all
large federal agency computer acquisitions since the late 1960s 1 .
For most large-valued procurement, GSA solicits bids for needs
specified by a Federal agency and selects the winning bid. The
policies governing GSA's bidding procedures have frequently been
a focal point of debate.
One issue for debate, the topic of this paper, concerned
• GSA's procedures for determining the winning bidder to supply a
computer system when the new acquisition is subject to
"conversion costs" — costs incurred as consequence of switching
suppliers of a mainframe computer system2 . In the late 1970s many
computer users complained that the GSA was not using systematic
procedures to account for "conversion costs" when choosing among
alternative suppliers' bids. A government accounting office (GAO)
report phrased the issue in the following manner:
"Would including conversion costs in computer procurement
result in selecting the (computer mainframe) system that
would cost the government the least over the lifetime of the
system?" (GAO, 1980, p. ii)
.
Though the GAO phrased the question clearly, most government
analyses, including the report just cited, have focused on
subsets of the economic issues3 . The GAO established through
careful work that switching costs could be large and could
influence procurement outcomes. However, the GAO reports
implicitly assume that bids should fully account for switching
costs under all circumstances. Hence, the reports assume that
establishing the existence of switching costs justifies
accounting for them .
In contrast to the GAO report, we show in this paper why
this assumption is not appropriate. There may be plausible
circumstances in which it is optimal not to account for switching
costs — even when those costs are large and can influence
procurement outcomes.
We compare two stylized procurement systems in which the
winner is chosen either by a third party, GSA, who does not
account for switching costs, or by the eventual user, who does
(correctly) account for switching costs. We call the first
"centralized" procurement and the latter "decentralized"
procurement 5 . We focus on whether it is plausible for the extra
competitive bidding in a procurement which ignores switching
costs to outweigh the losses from occasionally "unnecessarily"
switching computer suppliers.
Centralized procurement can be optimal for the federal
government as a budgetary unit (e.g. from OMB' s perspective) when
most agencies are "locked-in" to the low cost bidder. Centralized
procurement will elicit more competitive behavior from the bidder
who already has a competitive advantage without incurring much
expense from switching suppliers. On the other hand, when most
agencies are "locked-in" to the high cost bidder, decentralized
procurement will be favored over centralized procurement because
lower costs from switching more than make up for the higher
prices paid.
We also show that bidding using an under-estimate of
switching costs — or partly accounting for them — will trade
off the same factors. In some circumstances, under-estimates will
even be preferable to the extreme cases of "centralized" and
"decentralized" procurement. We conclude from this analysis that
the policy of ignoring switching costs, which appeared misguided
to many contemporary observers at the time, had some economic
merit.
This paper can be viewed in the context of recent attempts
by economists to understand the influence of switching costs on
competitive behavior and "lock-in", where the focus has been on
understanding pricing and entry when incumbent firms are at a
competitive advantage relative to non-incumbents6 . The issues in
this paper are also related to the literature on second sourcing
in government procurement, which discusses the trade-offs facing
policy makers when there is a choice among two alternative
vendors, one of whom has a previous history with the buyer, or
has progressed down a learning curve7 . While these previous
theoretical investigations are useful descriptions of the
possible behavioral dynamics, we think that the concrete policy
problem we describe here helps make an important economic
tradeoff more accessible and its implications more concrete.
2 . The debate surrounding computer procurement procedures
Changes in computer procurement policy in the 1970s affected
many users. Virtually every civilian agency and military fort
possesses one, if not many, general purpose mainframes to keep
records, process checks, and perform calculations.
By the late 1970s agencies had reasons to worry about
conversion costs and their impact of procurement decisions. Many
federal agencies feared that moving to alternative suppliers
would result in a large loss in the value of their previous
investments, especially if users had to convert idiosyncratic
complementary assets, such as large programming packages, to work
on the new system from an incompatible supplier . Moreover,
switching costs could potentially be large enough to affect the
outcomes of bids. The 1980 GAO report mentioned in the
introduction was one among several to show this9 .
Computer procurement by federal agencies was also shaped by
the nature of supervision. The acquisition and use of computers
in the federal government had been guided by the public law 89-
3 06 ("The Brooks Act", named for Congressman Jack Brooks (D,
Texas) of the House Government Operations Committee) , who had
long ago become interested in the procurement and use of federal
information technologies. The Brook's Act delegated to GSA the
authority to decide the winner of computer competitive bids 10 .
GSA could also delegate to agencies the authority to decide the
winner if GSA personnel so desired, and usually did so when the
procurement was small in value 11 . As a consequence, procurement
decisions could be made by someone other than the eventual user
of the system, and if not, then reviewed for approval.
The de-emphasis on switching costs in GSA-supervised
procurement was not a written policy, but one that was believed
by many participants to be de facto in place 12 . It was believed
that Brooks pursued policies to make procurement procedures more
"competitive", directing attention at eliminating "sole source"
procurement of systems, primarily from incumbent suppliers 13 . GSA
was not initially sympathetic to arguments that the costs of
switching to incompatible computer suppliers justified limiting
the number of competitors. GSA could not easily learn whether an
agency was exaggerating the costs to avoid supervision or gain a
larger budget. There was little reason to design an explicit
policy for switching costs without concrete proof that they were
unavoidably large. 14
The GAO (1980) report was a catalyst for change 15 . After
considerable debate at the end of the 1970s the GSA settled on a
policy for systematically estimating switching costs prior to any
procurement. These estimates were typically added to each
incompatible vendor's bid and agencies used the extra funds to do
the conversions themselves. 16 Comparisons between the pre-1979
bidding procedures and the system that "fully" account for
switching costs motivated our analysis below.
3. Economic Trade-offs in Computer Procurement Policy
To illustrate the economic tradeoffs between the alternative
regimes, we focus on a replacement purchase, a case where
switching costs are likely to be greatest. We assume there are
only two potential suppliers, firms h and 1, with constant
marginal cost c h and c , respectively. Without loss of
generality, we assume c h > c . For simplicity, mainframe
computers are assumed to be a homogeneous product, i.e., apart
from the costs of switching suppliers, users are indifferent
between firm h's and firm l's mainframes and agencies and
oversight committees identically evaluate competing products 17 .
Demand consists of "offices", each office demanding one unit
of the good with a reservation price of u 18 . We assume that m
offices are locked-in to firm h before any procurement takes
place, and that these offices must incur a cost s in order to
switch to firm 1, where s is assumed to be independent of the
firm to which an office is locked-in, and is distributed with
c.d.f. F(s). A similar description applies to the remaining 1-m
offices, who are locked into firm 1 and can switch to firm h at a
cost of s.
Throughout the paper, we will assume that the relevant
costs, c h
, c , and s, are common knowledge to buyers and sellers.
This turns out not to be an essential assumption for the points
we want to make, although, as we will see in the end of the
section, it abstracts from some other aspects of potential
interest.
The central result of this section concerns the choice of
the optimal procurement mechanism. While we recognize that
computer procurement subject to oversight is a complex process,
for heuristic purposes, we first consider two possible mechanisms
that are stylized models of the procurement policies followed
before and after 1979:
(i) Centralized procurement: The government commits to
provide bidding parity in the procurement process. The
lowest price bid is selected in each case independently
of the firm to which the office is locked-in.
(ii) Decentralized procurement: Each office is allowed
to take into account the costs of switching when
choosing the supplier. Therefore, only if the
difference in prices is greater than the switching
costs will an office decide to switch suppliers.
What are the outcomes under these two alternative
arrangements? Consider first the case of centralized procurement.
Given the fact that there is bidding parity, we have a simple
Bertrand game with different constant marginal costs. The low
cost firm (firm 1) prices just below the level of firm h and
takes all the market demand. The cost incurred by each office is
the price (P = ch ) plus the switching costs, if the incumbent
supplier is firm h. Therefore, total benefit to the government
from this type of procurement procedure is given by
(1) B
c
= u - c
h
- m E(s) .
where E(s) is the average value of s.
Note that the net benefits under this regime are decreasing
in m. The greater the number of offices locked-in to the high
cost supplier, the greater the expenses for switching suppliers
after the low cost supplier wins a bid.
In contrast, switching costs are taken into account in each
purchase in a decentralized procurement. We consider two possible
cases, depending on whether s is greater or smaller than the
difference s* = c h - c . If s > s*, then the incumbent firm, i.e.,
the firm to which the buyer is locked-in has a sufficiently large
strategic advantage that it sells even if it has a higher cost.
The price charged by the incumbent is given by the cost of the
other firm plus the value of s. Average benefit conditional on s
being greater that s is then given by
(2) B
dh
= u - m-(c l + sh ) - (l-m)-(ch + s h ) ,
where s h = E(s| s>s*) .
If, on the other hand, s < s
, then the low-cost firm has a
sufficiently large cost advantage that it sells even if it is not
incumbent. The price charged by the low cost firm is c h + s if it
is incumbent and c h - s if it is not. Average benefit conditional
on s being lower than s is then given by
(3) Bdl = u - m-(ch - s l + s l ) - (l-m)-(ch + s l ) ,
where s l = E(s|s < s*) .
Total benefit under the decentralized procurement regime is
given by
(4) B
d
= (1-F*) Bdh + F* Bdl
,
where F* = F(s*) . Substituting (2) and (3) into (4) and doing
some algebraic manipulation, we get
(5) B
d
= u - c
h
- E(s) + m K,
where K = (1 - F*) (c h - c l ) + F* s l > 0.
The benefit function under decentralized procurement is
increasing in m. The greater the number of offices locked-in to
the high cost firm, the fewer the firms that switch, and the
lower the total expenditure the entire government spends on
switching costs.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Proposition 1: If m is sufficiently small (resp. large) then the
regime of centralized procurement (resp. decentralized
procurement) yields higher net benefit.
The result follows straightforwardly by comparing (1) and
(5) . The intuition behind the proposition is quite simple, and
best explained for the extreme cases. When m is small, the low
cost firm has the advantage in a bidding game, whether or not
procurement is centralized. When switching costs are taken into
account (i.e., under the decentralized regime), the low cost
firm, if incumbent, has one less cost associated with its systems
than its competitor. This manifests itself in a higher price and
thus a lower benefit to the buyer. When m is large, on the other
hand, switching costs will be incurred in a centralized regime
quite often. The total switching costs will more than make up for
the lower prices induced by bidding parity. In other words, the
two regimes trade off the gains from a more competitive behavior
with the costs of switching suppliers as a consequence.
One of the peculiarities of a centralized regime is that
behavior which appears to be sub-optimal on a local level can be
optimal when viewed globally. In this case, even though an agency
might be better off not switching in a particular procurement,
the buyer is not responding to this knowledge, because more
competitive bidding makes the government better off over a wide
number of cases.
This feature of the model relates to similar themes found in
the theoretical economic literature on auctions — namely, if a
bidder can commit to a course of action, irrespective of the
information he receives later which may reveal that his strategy
is sub-optimal, then he may be better off. Commitment to one type
of action leads other players to change their behavior in a
favorable manner. Usually this observation is problematic,
because there is no practical method for ensuring the commitment
of the first decision maker. We have no such troubles here, since
the situation motivating our investigation provides ample
evidence that an institutional mechanism enforces the commitment
— namely, GSA decides the winner of the bid and administrative
law regulates procedures 19 .
In closing this section, we should mention that there are
various ways one can depart from the simple common-knowledge
model present here. For example, one can assume that production
costs are each firm's private information. The model would then
be isomorphic to an auction with a discriminating factor z
(McAfee and McMillan, 1985) , z being zero when switching costs
are ignored. This and other possible departures from the common
knowledge assumption make the model more difficult to solve
(sometimes impossible to solve analytically) , but do not change
the basic points brought out by the analysis of the simple case.
On the other hand, one must recognize that, in its
simplicity, our model leaves out some aspects of potential
interest. For example, we could discuss the case when s is the
buyer's private information and see what his or her incentives
are to reveal that information20 . We could also discuss the case
when s is known to the buyer and the incumbent firm, and see how
this affects the tradeoff between the two regimes 21 .
4. Choices among procurement regimes
The analysis implies that the existence of switching costs
associated with a purchase does not, per se, provide a compelling
reason for adopting a system that fully accounts for them.
Centralized procurement is optimal for the federal government as
a budgetary unit (e.g., from OMB's perspective) when most
agencies are "locked-in" to the low cost bidder; decentralized
procurement will be favored when most agencies are "locked-in" to
the high cost bidder. The analysis also implies that a system
which did not fully account for switching costs in the 1970s was
optimal if the dominant incumbent suppliers, such as IBM and
Univac, had lower costs than the new entrants. We note that this
condition was never discussed in the records of the debate.
Evidence that switching costs can alter outcomes or
complaints about "unnecessary switching" also does not provide a
sufficient reason to alter the procurement system (Yet, this was
the major substantive evidence in GAO 1980). In our model, an
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"unnecessary switch" in a centralized regime is a bid awarded to
the low cost supplier when the incumbent would have been awarded
the contract under a decentralized regime. Clearly, an optimal
centralized system will produce switches between manufacturers
that would not occur in a decentralized system, even when these
costs are correctly estimated.
The above argument does not entirely vitiate the force of
complaints in a centralized regime. "Unnecessary switching" could
result in complaints if it reflected more profound equity
problems in the centralized regime than are modelled here. The
costs and benefits of a centralized system may not be equally
borne by all offices, since any particular office may benefit
from more competitive pricing under the centralized regime, but
some offices "locked-in" to the high cost supplier will
"unnecessarily switch". If each office is constrained by a budget
that includes its own switching costs, then one can expect
complaints from the offices whose switching costs were ignored.
Thus, complaints will arise even if whether partly accounting for
switching costs is optimal or not for the entire government as a
budgetary unit.
We now consider a more general procurement regime in which a
fraction of switching costs is taken into account. This is
equivalent to a situation in which switching costs are
systematically underestimated. 22 Let the procurement authorities
commit to taking into account a fraction, p, of the switching
costs. Will the optimal p always be zero or one? In Appendix 1
we show that the total benefit for the government under this
"flexible regime" policy is given by
(6) B
f
= u - c
h
+ (l-F*)'m«(S - p*E(s) - (1 - 2p)-F*-m*s l
,
where
<5 = c
h
- c
l
,
s* = (c h - c l )/p, s l = E(s|s < s*) , and F* = F(s*). 24
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Although a systematic characterization of the optimal
solution is not possible, we can state the following general
results:
Proposition 2 : There exist parameter values such that p = is
optimal, p = 1 is optimal, and p e (0, 1) is optimal. For
example:
(i) If m is very small, then the optimal solution corresponds to
p = 0.
(ii) If m is very large, then p = 1 yields a higher benefit than
p = 0, but it may be the case that the optimal solution lies
strictly between zero and one.
(iii)If there is an interior solution and p < 1/2, then an
increase in m implies an increase in the optimal p.
(iv) If there is an interior solution and both p < 1/2 and m <
1/2, then an increase in 6 implies an increase in the optimal p.
The proof may be found in Appendix 2. The proposition
provides some insight into the comparative statics of the optimal
choice. However, even with the simple structure of our model the
derivation of the optimal p turns out to be fairly complex.
Through numerical simulations we have found that p is
strictly between zero and one generally for cases where m is
neither very large nor very small. As an illustration, Figure 1
plots Bp as a function of p, assuming that ch = 1.1, c l = 1, m =
.5, u = 2, and s is uniformly distributed between zero and one.
As can be seen, p = .215 maximizes the government's total
benefit.
This analysis makes clear that under-estimating switching
costs also trades off the costs of additional "unnecessary"
switching costs with the more competitive behavior induced from
12
incumbents. In some circumstances, the intermediate solution may
be better that the extreme solutions of not accounting or fully
accounting for switching costs.
5. Final Remarks
The main message of our paper is that complaints about GSA's
procedures for accounting for switching costs too superficially
scratched the surface of the relevant economic issues. We have
shown that there may be merit in ignoring those costs, because
the increased competitiveness in response to bidding parity can
outweigh the costs of "unnecessarily" switching between
suppliers.
We have also shown that the 1980 GAO report should not have
presumed that proof of the existence of switching costs was
sufficient to motivate systematically fully accounting for them
in all computer procurement. In our view, to make that claim the
report should have also investigated the degree to which the
earlier procedures were eliciting more competitive bidding
behavior from incumbent vendors, as well as the degree to which
federal offices were "unnecessarily" switching vendors 25 . Such an
investigation would have to fully account for the extent of the
federal installed base with different vendors and try to estimate
the competitive positions of these vendors 6 . We are not arguing
that the policies of the 1970s and 1980s were correct or
incorrect, only that changing them required fully considering
several fundamental economics issues underlying the policy27 .
The next step of this research should investigate whether
imperfect estimation of the costs of switching alters the
relevant trade-offs. Further work could also explicitly model the
conflicts between the supervising and supervised agencies in
order to understand the relevance of this conflict for the choice
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among alternative policy rules 28 . This research could emphasize,
among other things, that oversight agencies establish routine
procedures as a means to monitor and elicit control over sub-
agencies (See McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1988)). If GSA
auditors found it costly to collect that information, how did
they prevent offices from "loading up" on switching costs if it
wanted to favor an incumbent supplier? If switching costs were
paid for by the supplier at the time of a new acquisition, how
did the GSA prevent offices from not avoiding costs today that
increase switching costs later on? Understanding the efficacy of
these administrative solutions allows us to understand more fully
the relative merits of alternative procurement policies when
products are subject to switching costs.
14
Appendix 1: The expected benefits under the flexible regime
We suppose that a fraction p of the switching costs is taken
into account, the crucial value of s is now s* (ch - c l )/p.
If s > s*, then the incumbent always sells at price
c
l
+ p«s with probability m
c
h
+ p*s with probability 1 - m.
If s < s*, then the low cost firm always sells at price
c
h
+ p*s with probability m
c
l
+ p»s with probability 1 - m
and a switching cost s is paid with probability m.
Total benefits is therefore
(Al) B f = u - (1 - F*)-[ m« (c l + p-s h ) + (1 - m) • (ch + p-s h ) ]
- F*-[ m« (ch - p«s l + p«s l ) + (1 - m) • (c
h
+ p«s 1 )]
which can be simplified into the expression in the text.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) Substituting m = in (3), we get
(A2) B f = u - ch - P'E(s)
and the result follows straightforwardly.
(ii) The first part of the result corresponds to Proposition 1.
The ambiguity of the optimal solution is evident by computing the
derivative SB f/6p (done below) for m = p = 1. One can find
functions F() for which this is negative, which implies an
interior optimal solution.
(iii) and (iv) We make use of the following useful Lemma (See,
for example, Varian (1984)):
Suppose z(y) = argmax f(x,y), then
(A3) sign (<Sz/6y) = sign (<5 2 f/<5x<Sy) .
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Differentiating (3) with respect to p, we get
(A4) <5B f/<5p = f (M/P) * (M/P2 ) *m*M - E(s) + 2 • F (m/P) •• s l
+ (1 - 2p) .f(/i/p) '(M/P2 ) -m-s l + (1 - 2p) .F(/i/p) -m- (m 2/P3 ) -f(M/p)
where we use the fact that sd = s»dF(s)
J o
and therefore 6s [/Sp = Ss*/Sp'S*' f (s*) = - (/i/p2 ) • (/x/p) • f (/x/p) .
Taking the derivative of (A4) with respect to m and \i , and
applying the above lemma the results follow.
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Endnotes
1. See GAO (1977a) for a summary of the structure of computer
procurement.
2. "Switching costs" refer to the costs associated with moving to
a new supplier. These are not to be confused with conversion
expenses which would be incurred irrespective of the identity of
the new supplier, i.e. expenses associated with technically
"orphaned systems" — systems with no available upward compatible
upgrade.
3. Two issues which received much attention included: (1) What
principles should guide the implementation of policies for
incorporating switching costs into procurement?; and (2) What can
be done to aid agency managers in reducing the costs of
conversion? See GAO (1977b, 1980)
.
4. GAO (1977b, 1980) both assume that the procurement system
ought to account for switching costs. In addition, they also
assume that switching costs could be accurately estimated. For
many technical reasons, this is difficult to accomplish
(Greenstein 1989, chapter 2). P. R. Werling's (1983) doctoral
thesis provides detailed accounts of the political dynamics and
administrative shortcomings of federal computer procurement
policy, but his discussion also presumes that the procurement
system ought to fully account for switching costs.
5. While we could imagine a centralized procurement system that
accounts for switching costs, we maintain this terminology for
simplicity.
6. See Farrell (1986), Farrell and Shapiro (1986a), and (1986b),
and Klemperer (1986)
.
7. See Anton and Yao (1987), Demski, Sappington and Spiller
(1987), Farrell and Gallini (1987), Laffont and Tirole (1987),
and Riordan and Sappington (1988)
8. Several mainframe system manufacturers had developed
compatible families of systems and offered upgrades — the IBM
360 and 370 families being the most popular — which were
compatible with each other but not with systems made by other
firms. By the 1970s many agency offices had built a substantial
library of software investment that was compatible with only one
firm's systems and potentially very costly to replace. See
Greenstein (1989), chapter 2, for more technical detail.
9. The GAO report brought to light examples where the procurement
procedures did not reflect the full costs of switching between
alternative suppliers. The GAO auditors observed that if the GSA
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did not fully account for these "conversion expenses", then the
bid would not fully reflect the costs the user would eventually
incur, the supplier with the lowest "lifetime costs" would not
always be chosen, and users would unnecessarily incur switching
expenses "too frequently". GAO (1977, 1980) are the best sources.
For other useful retrospective studies see GSA (1983, 1986), and
NBS (1980a, 1980b). Also see Werling (1983).
10. Among its directives, the Brooks Act also delegated authority
for computer procurement policy and decision making to several
federal agencies, the GSA, the National Bureau of Standard (NBS)
,
and the Bureau of the Budget (later to become the Office of
Management and budget (OMB) )
.
11. Guidelines today are set at $50,000 for sole-source
procurement and $3 00,000 for competitive procurement. See NBS
(1983)
.
12. It was widely believed that Congressman Brooks held ultimate
authority over the purchase of any large computer system to which
he turned his attention, though he never retained any formal
authority to veto a computer procurement (Petrillo, 1982). Paul
Werling, who wrote a thesis on the Brooks Act, alleges that
Brooks especially targeted the dominant system supplier in the
early 1970s, IBM (Werling, 1983).
13. A sole source contract is one where an agency contracts with
a single contractor. If the supplier possessed a "unique
capability and experience", agencies could justify bypassing
competitive procedures.
14. Indeed, this proof was not forthcoming until the GAO did its
reports in the late 1970s. These demonstrated that switching
costs existed for technical reasons which are unaffected by an
agency's behavior, that switching costs could be large, and,
moreover, could be large enough to alter the outcomes of bids if
correctly estimated. See GAO (1980), which focused on six case
studies. On the presumption that bidding does not change, GAO
concluded that accounting for switching costs would have altered
outcomes in two cases.
15. It was not the sole publication on the issue. GAO (1977a,
1977b) contained research that foreshadowed the results in the
1980 GAO report. These were quickly followed by NBS reports on
related topics. See NBS (1980a, 1980b).
16. Agencies prefer to do this because of difficulties associated
with contracting out for software conversion. Contracts cannot
account for all contingencies, nor guarantee precisely the
desired performance — agencies found they had to substantially
revise conversions done out of house.
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17. We ignore the possibility that agencies and oversight
committees might differently evaluate the same vendor traits, due
to different marginal valuations of the next dollar spend from
capital and operating budgets. See Greenstein (1989, Chapter 2)
for greater detail.
18. Throughout the analysis, we assume that u is sufficiently
large, so that it is not a binding constraint.
19. This ignores the incentives for a foresighted agency to
report technical specifications that "unnecessarily" favor one
supplier. It presumes that the central authority can elicit
truthful information about the agency's needs. See Greenstein
(1989, chapter 2)
.
20. Basically, if sellers have approximately the same cost and s
is low, then it is in the buyer's interest to reveal that
information, assuming that switching costs are to be taken into
account in the bidding process. However, it is unclear whether
there could ever be any credible information disclosure, for a
high-s buyer would also benefit by convincing sellers that his or
her s is low.
21. Our first guess is that the centralized mechanism would be
relatively more favored in this case, because, in addition to the
switching costs, the incumbent firm would have an information
advantage relative to its rival.
22. We believe that this is a relevant issue because any
definition of a switching cost is in practice somewhat arbitrary,
and thus, can systematically under-estimate the true switching
cost the agency incurs.
23. In practice, this could be done through rules which limit
what features an office may require in its technical
specifications, and thus, what expenses a seller must cover in
each procurement. This ignores the incentives of a foresighted
agency to misrepresent the level of "allowable" switching costs,
as a means to favor an incumbent supplier. We presume that the
central authority can elicit truthful information about the level
of switching costs. For related discussion, see Greenstein (1989,
chapter 2)
.
24. Note that s*, s , and F* are a function of p.
25. Indeed, these issues were investigated in the six cases
examined in GAO (1980) , though no estimate was given of the
extent to which these were representative. In addition, the
conclusions about "unnecessary switching" in those reports
presumed that the prices in bids would not change under different
procurement rules, and that using the actual costs incurred in
switching between vendors could serve as a reasonable proxy for
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what would have been estimated prior to switching. While these
may not have been harmful assumptions for the particular cases
investigated there, it is an important qualification for a wider
investigation. See the appendix to GAO (1980) for detail.
26. For example, suppose the largest incumbent mainframe vendor
during the 1970s, IBM, was at a cost disadvantage relative to
competitors, then there would be economic justification for
accounting for switching costs.
27. We also note that the relative benefit to the two regimes
would differ if central authorities wanted to develop a more
"competitive" industry by using government procurement to
"subsidize" several non-dominant (and non-incumbent) industry
suppliers — which was commonly alleged when federal agencies
purchased non-IBM equipment.
28. See Greenstein (1989, chapter 2) for steps in this direction
22
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